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Abstract: The revolutions that have taken place in Eastern Europe and the beginning of the century 
were a first element considered to identify the potential of social movements in the transformation of 
the realities of the states in different latitudes and the importance of globalization in this type of mani-
festations. However, the achievements of civil society in this scenario have been overshadowed by the 
resurgence of conflicts. In this sense, this article studies the particular case of Ukraine and then raises 
how the orange revolution was a milestone in the awakening to democracy of a communist state but 
that the claim of civil society lacked structural elements that allowed the consolidation of an econom-
ic, political and social model adjusted to its own conditions. 
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INTRODUCCIÓN 
From a realistic perspective, international 
relations have been identified, almost im-
mediately, with the figure of the State and 
with the way in which these political units 
establish links with each other. In this con-
text, it is common to relate the internation-
al to everything that happens outside na-
tional borders, but only and exclusively 
among state actors. This is how the proc-
lamation of the State as the central unit of 
analysis of the international system, made 
the observers of this dynamic pay little 
attention to the emergence of other types 
of actors, whose activity made understand-
ing the global situation more complex.  
Today, these actors of a subnational, trans-
national, global or mixed nature compete 
more intensely with national governments, 
to the point of refuting the monopoly of 
the State as the only agent capable of pro-
moting social reforms. In this context, civil 
society has emerged as a key actor in the 
framework of the transformations of the 
State and the processes of globalization. 
Manifested in increasingly heterogeneous 
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and complex organizations, which express 
diverse social, political, cultural and ideo-
logical belongings. (From Piero, S. 2005)  
In the seventies, the fusion of political and 
non-political spheres in social life began 
when analyzing the change of structures 
and dynamics promoted by governments in 
search of development. In this scenario, the 
analytical utility of the conventional sepa-
ration between the State and civil society 
began to be questioned. There were merger 
processes between both spheres, not only 
at the level of global socio-political mani-
festations but also at the level of citizens as 
primary political actors. (Offe, C. 1992)  
Eastern Europe was one of the most im-
portant scenarios for the development of 
this type of combination and it was there 
that movements of civil society were put in 
vogue with a clear position in front of the 
political processes that were gestated with-
in the countries of the region.  
In this way, the revolutions of colors, 
(Rodríguez, A. 2011) as, the Orange Revo-
lution of Ukraine, the Revolution Grape of 
Moldova, the Rojiblanca Revolution of 
Belarus, and the revolutions of the flowers 
like the Revolution of the Roses in Geor-
gia, and the Revolution of the Tulips in 
Kyrgyzstan, became transcendental mani-
festations of civil society in search of the 
democratic development of the post-
communist countries of central and eastern 
Europe. 
Its characteristics focus on non-violent 
actions against authoritarian regimes, the 
implementation of the liberal model and 
the strengthening of national independ-
ence. To demonstrate it tacitly, these revo-
lutions usually adopted a color or a flower 
as a symbol, to reaffirm that their actions, 
implemented by Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations (NGOs) and student-based, 
were inscribed in non-violent political ac-
tion. (Gordon, P. and Chollet, D. 2005). 
Despite the media condition, and relevance 
of these events, it was only afterwards that 
interest was raised to understand the activi-
ty of civil society actors in peripheral sce-
narios registered in non-democratic con-
texts, since before that time they consid-
ered themselves as actors secondary, una-
ble to alter in any way or to some degree 
the order of the international system. 
(McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, 
M. N. 1999)  
This vision of the world allowed for the 
development of a state-centered scheme 
structured at center-periphery levels, in 
which the States belonging to the center 
had the faculty to establish the guidelines 
that governed the world order, while the 
countries of the periphery were limited to 
follow the political, economic and cultural 
models that emanated from that center. (Di 
Filippo, A. 1998). 
However, authors such as Zald, Mc Carthy 
and Mc Adam, (1999), have pointed out 
the biased condition in which this way of 
understanding international relations is 
presented, and have extolled the scarce 
efforts that have been made in the interna-
tional system to try to understand a more 
complex context composed of a wide range 
of actors, as or even more powerful than 
some States. From this divergence, the 
actors of the periphery, as well as those 
who do not hold a relevant rank in terms of 
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power, are outside the categories of analy-
sis of the theory and cannot be understood 
as significant agents of social transfor-
mation for the international relations. 
Therefore, the phenomenon of democratic 
renewal that occurs at the end of 2004 in 
Ukraine calls on students of political and 
social phenomena to reflect on the implica-
tions of having antagonistic actors within 
the international board.  
Now, in this complex scenario in itself, 
social movements become an engine of 
democratic progression both in Ukraine 
and throughout Eastern Europe where in-
tense collective action in opposition to 
authoritarian practices and in favor of 
strengthening democracy at the head of the 
Ukrainian student movement is recognized 
as an element of rupture with traditional 
forms of participation.  
Its reach extends beyond national borders 
and projects a change in the balance of 
power of the post-Soviet era, leading other 
countries to develop their own version of 
the so-called Orange Revolution. This is 
how the Romanians and Belarusians are 
the first to follow the Ukrainian legacy, 
demanding transparency in the presidential 
elections of December 2004. A few 
months later, in March 2005, thousands of 
people in Moldova and in Lebanon also 
consciously invoked the Ukrainian experi-
ence in demand for a democratic govern-
ment for its people. At the same time, 
Kyrgyzstan, also inspired by the Ukrainian 
experience, promoted the so-called Tulip 
Revolution with the aim of transforming 
the authoritarian rules institutionalized by 
the executive. (Oñativia, O, G. D. E. I. 
2014)  
It is important to clear then that the 
Ukrainian experience was a historically 
significant event, which led governments 
with undemocratic characteristics such as 
Russia Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uz-
bekistan, to strengthen controls over the 
activity of the opposition, to avoid the un-
leashing of a peaceful revolution like the 
one experienced in Ukraine in 2004. 
(Åslund, A., & McFaul, M. (Eds.). 2006)  
However, it is important to note on the 
other hand, that despite the victory of the 
Ukrainian social movements in 2004, some 
authors point out that the conflict that 
arose in 2014, and the shadows of a mili-
tary invasion by the Russian Federation 
cannot be understood without analyzing 
the scope and failures of the called Orange 
Revolution, "an event of unquestionable 
importance in post-communist Europe, 
where democracy never finished solid 
roots, because the dynamics to administer 
power is not only resolved by means of 
electoral rules and definition of democratic 
institutions." (Gamboa, F. 2014).  
This is also evident when the revolution is 
analyzed in a broader context when Víktor 
Yushenko became president, and Yulia 
Tymoshenko became Prime Minister, 
bringing its policy closer to the West with 
the aim of integrating into the European 
Union and the Treaty Organization. North 
Atlantic, (NATO), the economic problems 
and the energy dependence of Russia made 
this task difficult. (Priego, A. 2014). 
The events presented above make it clear 
that civil society has played an important
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role in different impact scenarios, focused 
on the development of social transfor-
mation objectives. However, their role has 
also been criticized in that it is not only 
about meeting their needs, but also about 
making impact evaluations to ensure that 
their interventions generate favorable con-
ditions in the long term in the environment 
in which they are developed.  
Therefore, this article focuses on analyzing 
the extent to which the Ukrainian orange 
revolution, beyond being a social trans-
formation, was an accelerated transition 
towards a weak democracy that, for geo-
strategic reasons, should later return the 
principles of the old Russian communist 
axis.  
With the aim of developing this problem, 
the hypothesis on which this document 
focuses is that despite the fact that the Or-
ange Revolution was a successful process 
in the actions of Civil Society, it lacked 
structural elements that would allow it to 
redeem achievements in the long run. a 
term for the consolidation of democracy at 
the interior of the Ukrainian State.  
To develop this hypothesis, the study will 
focus on two relevant variables, the first 
focused on defining the role of civil socie-
ty in the social transformation achieved 
from the orange revolution and the second 
in studying the Ukrainian State and its 
democratic process at the end of the said 
revolution. With these elements, some 
conclusions will be developed relevant that 
will allow responding to the problem out-
lined and thus demonstrate the veracity or 
otherwise of the hypothesis initially risen.  
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION  
The phenomena of participation of civil 
society in processes of democratic trans-
formation in Eastern Europe give an ac-
count of the ability of social movements to 
impact on decision-making processes with-
in the States until they become relevant 
issues on the international stage.  
If this dynamic is observed from the for-
mal conception of democracy, falling on 
the faculty of choosing, and being elected. 
If analyzed from limited approaches of 
representation by elites competing for 
power, or if they are evaluated in the light 
of neo-institutional theories where the 
State is the only agent capable of promot-
ing political, economic or social transfor-
mation, it is simply not possible to under-
stand the contribution of social movements 
to democratic processes, or even could be 
mistakenly labeled as destabilizing actors 
of the same. (Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. 
F. 1996). 
On the contrary, if the verticality of this 
type of understanding is overcome, leading 
to these phenomena being approached 
from a broader constructivist perspective, 
in which the other actors of civil society 
have space, social movements could begin 
to be understood as decisive pieces of the 
democratic construction, as they open the 
doors of deliberation and embody direct 
political participation.  
In addition to their contribution to the 
democratic strengthening of the States in 
which they were formed, civil society 
movements have been involved in the dy-
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namics of international relations, establish-
ing transnational ties with actors from oth-
er latitudes such as NGOs, foundations or 
others social movements, achieving in this 
sense the configuration of global civil so-
ciety.  
According to Markoff, since 1780, move-
ments for democracy have been transna-
tional, as their members move from one 
movement to another and carry their con-
ceptions and interests with them. Transna-
tionalism has occurred, in part, because 
democratizing social movements have 
crossed borders themselves, and, in part, 
because governments are sensitive to what 
different agents do in other countries. In 
other words, the knowledge of what social 
movements have achieved elsewhere is 
often an important impulse for new social 
movements to have an impact in similar 
spheres. (Markoff, J. 1999). 
The fact that the activity of social move-
ments has crossed national borders is due, 
according to the same author, to three situ-
ations: first, to the replication of structural 
circumstances. This means that when cer-
tain features such as social structure mi-
grate transnationally, the concomitant ele-
ments of social movements do so in a simi-
lar way; second, to the transmission of the 
cultural model. This occurs when issues 
and movement techniques migrate across 
borders, through the establishment of ac-
tion networks. (Markoff, J. 1999) That is, 
forms of collective action that can be com-
bined with a wide variety of ideas and or-
ganizations (Tarrow, S. 1999); and third, 
the displacement of people across national 
borders, since, as they migrate, people car-
ry with them their experience as a particu-
lar model of conflict.  
From the author's proposal, it is inferred 
that the birth of the Ukrainian student 
movement was due in large part to the 
momentum provided by other organiza-
tions formed in other latitudes of Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, which were also 
at that time engaged with the processes of 
expansion and strengthening of democra-
cy.  
This fact demonstrates how global civil 
society as an agent and medium at the 
same time, has at its disposal the networks 
to achieve political mobilization (Marín 
Aranguren, EM 2010), and therefore man-
ages to pressure and influence state organi-
zations and governments to revert or sup-
port a decision that wants to take in a given 
environment and that generates direct con-
sequences on global development.  
The influence of social movements and 
transcendence of global civil society be-
comes visible in this case in the year 2000, 
when Milosevich was forced to abandon 
power in Serbia due to the pressure of the 
movement student OTPOR. “Resistance” 
in Serbian, and three years later, Edgard 
Shevarnadze, president of Georgia, ran 
with the same fate as his Serbian counter-
part, when the student-based movement, 
KMARA, “Enough” in Georgian, forced 
him to resign (Morgan M. 2004). The ac-
tivity of the OTPOR members went be-
yond the borders of Serbia and nurtured 
the campaign carried out by KMARA ac-
tivists. Between the two movements, a 
permanent communication network was 
established through which information;
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experiences, training, and resources were 
exchanged.  
On March 9, 2004, the student movement 
PORA of Ukraine declared its official con-
formation and made public its commit-
ment: to advance an intensely political 
activity in order to expand and strengthen 
the discredited Ukrainian democracy. Its 
members included the four largest youth 
organizations in Ukraine: the Christian 
Democratic Youth of Ukraine, the Union 
of Ukrainian Youth, the Prosvita Youth, 
the Law Students Association, as well as 
student organizations from different uni-
versities and educational institutes, and 
members of the Ukrainian coalition of 
NGO Freedom of Choice (Demes, P., & 
Forbrig, J. 2006).  
Subsequently, the student movement estab-
lished its way of maneuver guided by the 
action strategies and the training of the 
members of the OTPOR, and the KMA-
RA, supported also by international NGOs, 
as well as different governments of the 
countries belonging to the European Un-
ion, and the government of the United 
States who contributed to the training of 
the new activists and participated in the 
monitoring of the electoral processes.  
The experts also point out that the Orange 
Revolution was the first to be organized in 
a certain way via online "The Digital Rev-
olutionary Stage of Ukraine was based on 
several emerging tools. These tools have a 
wide range of uses, from the coordination 
of activists through SMS with the devel-
opment of an independent organization of 
discussion forums, websites, blogs for ac-
tivists where to share best practices and 
make detailed reports of electoral fraud 
"(Goldstein, J. 2007)  
This is how the challenges posed by global 
civil society and the union of diverse forc-
es that converged in this transformation, 
made Ukraine the channel through which 
the western model of democracy would be 
disseminated. NATO called this event a 
success in the democratic enlargement 
"The emergence of new democratic states 
is a characteristic of the new world order. 
Their ability to survive and prosper as in-
dependent states poses a challenge to both 
institutions and nations themselves. In this 
sense, Ukraine occupies a crucial place in 
Europe. An independent, stable and demo-
cratic Ukraine is an element of strategic 
importance for the evolution of democracy 
throughout Europe "(Solana, J. 1997).  
Reaffirming the foregoing, foreign policy 
experts pointed out at that time that a liber-
al, independent and West-oriented Ukraine 
was the only guarantee that, in the long 
term, Russia would converge in the same 
direction. According to these views, the 
democratic victory in Ukraine marked the 
end of the defense of the classic French-
German model of negotiating with Russia, 
ignoring its authoritarianism and its impe-
rialist interests, and this would force it to 
use an Anglo-Saxon liberal language, ra-
ther than a reason of State continental to 
retain its influence in the framework of the 
new world order. (Wilson, A. 2005). 
In this sense, this model indicates not only 
the capacity of civil society movements to 
create links, and establish networks for the 
achievement of precise objectives in a 
struggle based on non-violent collective
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action, but also demonstrates the influence 
that, they generate the interests of the great 
powers within the framework of interna-
tional politics, considering, in this case, the 
geostrategic importance of this country for 
security and democracy in Europe. (Plo, 
R., & Antonio, R. 2004). 
In the same way, it is clear that the national 
State was at some point the framework to 
interpret or predict the activities deployed 
by civil society actors, but now, the mobi-
lization takes place on multiple levels. So-
cial movements have developed broad 
transnational factions and links so that the 
state structure has become only an initial 
tool to understand how collective action 
arises and operates, so its development 
must be analyzed having in mind it has a 
broader spectrum, which also involves the 
elements of the international context. (Tar-
row, S. 1999)  
DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE AFTER 
THE ORANGE REVOLUTION  
According to the postulates defended by 
the global civil society gathered in the very 
spirit of the orange revolution, since Presi-
dent Víctor Yushchenko took office, on 
January 25, 2005, Ukraine began a new 
stage in his political life. The objectives of 
changing the external image of Ukraine, 
consolidating democracy, fundamental 
freedoms and the observance of human 
rights would be the demands that would be 
achieved in the new democratic process. In 
this scenario, the use of state agencies as 
an element of pressure for the media to 
disseminate the government's opinion with 
exclusivity and ended the abuse against 
freedom of expression ceased. (Zubelzú, G 
2007). 
 
However, analysts point out that Yush-
chenko turned out to be an indecisive lead-
er once in power, fulfilling what little had 
been on the agenda during his time as pres-
ident, presenting lesser management than 
any other president during the post-Soviet 
period of Ukraine. (Fairbanks, C. H. 
(2007). 
 
 The new Constitution of Ukraine with the 
reforms implemented by the new leaders, 
modified the distribution of powers be-
tween the president, the Prime Minister, 
and the Parliament, transforming the polit-
ical regime of the country, by reducing the 
powers of the president and his subsequent 
assignment of these responsibilities to Par-
liament and the Prime Minister.  
 
This new distribution of functions was not 
a structural reform to legitimize the institu-
tions, but was developed as a political 
game to give greater relevance to an insti-
tution in such a way that its influence was 
decisive in the decision making of the 
country. The political game led to the need 
to give power to the opposition to achieve 
balance and the economic decline began to 
make visible in the population in general. 
Growth fell from twelve percent to five 
percent and inflation reached 15 percent. 
(Márquez Muñoz, J. 2014). 
 
However, the greatest mistake was in the 
nationalization and re-privatization in fa-
vor of the elites, as well as various scan-
dals that aroused the interest of different 
actors but that forgot the claims that had 
given raise to the mobilization of civil so-
ciety in the orange revolution.  
 
Its position pointed at achieving the entry 
of Ukraine into the European Union sup-
ported by the Europeanists and in this con-
text of regulation and adjustment for the 
fulfillment of requirements of annexation 
to this organization, the economic conse
LIGIA ANDREA FLÓREZ CUBILLOS 
 
 
 REVISTA CIENTÍFICA PROFUNDIDAD FCAE       21 
 
quences of the imposition of a Liberal 
democratic State, not They were waiting. 
The Russian Federation decided to impose 
restrictions and tariff barriers on products 
from Ukraine. At that time, the Russian 
Federation used its most powerful weapon, 
the gas, and proposed to energetically 
drown the rebellious country. (Fernández, 
R. 2006). 
 
Confidence went down to such an extent in 
a society that, in 2010, the elections gave 
the victory to Viktor Yanukovych and the 
claims made by civil society through the 
orange revolution were left behind. The 
new president reversed the constitutional 
reform, returning to a presidential model. 
His model also required a number of ad-
justment reforms which accumulated a 
huge state debt, over 65,000 million dol-
lars. This further aggravated the Ukrainian 
economic situation, together with the un-
compromising position of Russia, which 
sold gas to Ukraine at a higher price than 
other European countries, despite the fact 
that it needed to use Ukrainian gas pipe-
lines. (Goncharova, G., Montaner, A., & 
Ryzhykov, Y. V. 2014).   
 
All these situations further weakened the 
governability and lack of identity among 
the inhabitants of a country divided be-
tween pro-European and pro-Russian, 
causing that after the rejection of the sign-
ing of a long-term agreement with the Eu-
ropean Union and the decision to strength-
en the ties with Russia, the crisis did not 
wait. “The inhabitants of Western Ukraine 
felt a great affinity with Europe and, in 
particular, wished to join the European 
Union. In sharp contrast, the inhabitants of 
eastern and southern Ukraine recognized in 
Russia the origin of their culture, religion, 
and language, so their desire was to belong 
to that nation”. (Mancera, A. C. 2014)  
 
The crisis is still going on and the country 
today is divided again between Western 
liberal policies and its Soviet past marked. 
The conditions after the orange revolution 
did not mark a different scenario for 
Ukraine, suddenly the basic transfor-
mations that were fought in the revolution 
were not claimed, and the crisis that occurs 
twelve years later has the same motiva-
tions.  
 
The development of the conflict and the 
associated costs (particularly the economic 
prejudices derived from special agreements 
with Russia), hardly contribute to improv-
ing the economic and social situation, 
while social confrontation on an ethnic 
basis can lead to lasting social divisions 
that crystallize in political conflicts long 
projection (Cardone, I. J. 2014). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The phenomena of globalization and trans-
nationalization have meant that States can 
no longer interfere in all matters that take 
place in the world. The interstate system 
has ceased to be the only possible scheme 
within the international system and has 
come to coexist with multiple actors who 
have the faculty to generate innovations, as 
well as to influence the social, political and 
economic transformations that occur, in an 
accelerated manner nowadays. (Cohen, S. 
2005). 
 
The Ukrainian Orange Revolution demon-
strated that the rigid conception of democ-
racy, centered on electoral elements, and of 
international relations, focused on the cen-
trism state, has been shortsighted when it 
comes to addressing new forms of sociali-
zation. In the current international scenar-
io, diverse actors converge with multiple 
interests, where social transformations are
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no longer the exclusive responsibility of 
the States.  
 
On the contrary, new participants coexist 
as the movements of global civil society, 
who have become the engine of processes 
as significant as the democratic transition 
of the political regimes of Eastern Europe.  
 
However, when analyzing the particular 
case of Ukraine, it is evident how the ac-
tivity of the student movement contributed 
to the questioning in front of democratic 
processes, traditionally understood from 
the figure of the political parties. However, 
with the Orange Revolution, it demonstrat-
ed that the strengthening of democracy 
depends on structural issues that include 
the action of the elites, citizen empower-
ment and the exercise of active opposition, 
capable of creating spaces for public de-
bate and political participation direct. 
 
Achieving a goal of transformation is not 
an easy task and the context of global civil 
society and its most relevant actors must 
take into account these weaknesses in their 
actions. In the Ukrainian scenario, civil 
society had to ask the political elites to 
negotiate to avoid stagnation in such a way 
that the conflict did not end with acts of 
violence. The latter limited the actions of 
the social movement and its effective in-
tervention in the democratic sphere since, 
as Gamboa (2014) mentions, power nego-
tiations were transferred to the Supreme 
Court, the Parliament and the Electoral 
Commission.  
 
In the same way, it is clear that after the 
revolution the access of civil society to the 
decision-making processes was limited, the 
rulers worried only about their personal 
achievements and their deepest ideals, 
leaving aside the fundamental basis of de-
mocracy, that is, the government of the 
people. This also turned down civil society 
immensely, since, as various authors point 
out, "access is absolutely crucial to the 
capacity of civil society to promote good 
governance." (Laverty, N. 2008). 
 
In this context, it is clear that it is not pos-
sible to resolve a historically rooted con-
flict without taking into account the geopo-
litical and economic conditions of the 
country in which it develops. In addition, 
in the particular case already presented, it 
is clear that Ukraine depends on the energy 
resources of Russia and therefore in a real-
istic context moving away from a strategic 
partner will not bring any positive conse-
quence for its economic development. 
 
 
The Civil society clearly has a role in in-
ternational relations, its processes of col-
lective action in favor of a general interest, 
the use of networks and the exploitation of 
the potential of the mass movement means 
that they must be considered in a broad 
panorama and their activities must be mon-
itored. However, it is not possible to affirm 
that these movements can generate struc-
tural changes and even less if they do not 
work very close to the States because to 
generate this type of deep transformations 
a series of commitments is necessary not 
only of national actors but to review in 
context the international environment at 
the time of making decisions.  
 
Ukraine’s case, also has other edges that 
further complicate the outlook, Russia, the 
United States, the European Union, and 
NATO claim this country as part of their 
allies, every manifestation of civil society 
has been influenced by any of these actors 
and together, all they have achieved with 
this convergence of interests is an unstable 
and drifting country where violence and 
lack of identity have generated a conflict 
of international character and a partial tri-
umph for global civil society making it “a
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simple popular wave of discontent .” (Za-
rembo, K. 2011)  
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